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Abstract
Rationale People often face decisions that pit self-interested
behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against nor-
mative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits
others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness
norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus,
normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards
and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical pro-
cesses mediating the impact of these influences remain un-
known. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic sys-
tem to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but
this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts.
Objectives The present study investigates dopaminergic drug
effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoid-
ance in social interaction.
Methods Two-hundred one healthy male participants were
randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxypheny-
lalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic
bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in
which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair
behavior could not be punished.
Results In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA ad-
ministration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated
through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA
administration had no significant effect on behavior when
faced with punishment threats.
Conclusions The results of this study broaden the role of the
dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social in-
teractions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopa-
minergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in
turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships
between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behav-
iors in certain clinical subpopulations.
Keywords Dopamine . Reward . Punishment . Normative
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Introduction
Central to the emergence of large and complex societies has
been the development of and adherence to fairness norms
(Henrich et al. 2010). If these norms are violated by acting
selfishly and unfairly at the cost of other people's resources,
the wrongdoer is usually punished. Experimental evidence
shows that a threat of punishment for defying the fairness
norm sustains cooperative behavior (Fehr and Gächter
2002). Thus, the threat of punishment is a strong force in
maintaining normative behavior. However, in the absence of
such threat, there is a temptation to violate the fairness norm
and seek personal gain. Recent experimental evidence also
shows that people who are highly attracted by monetary
rewards tend to violate fairness norms and follow their self-
interest (Haselhuhn and Mellers 2005). In sum, the extent to
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which an individual seeks rewards and avoids punishments is
an important factor in determining normative behavior.
Despite the well-known fact that human social interaction
is guided by both reward seeking and punishment avoidance
(Fehr and Gächter 2002), the neurochemical underpinnings of
such processes are not well understood. Dopamine is a neu-
rotransmitter predominately associated with reward seeking
(Schultz 2007), but its role in guiding behavior in the face of
impending punishments is the subject of some debate (Bayer
and Glimcher 2005; Salamone 1994; Ungless et al. 2004).
Although dopamine neurons that respond to cues indicating
punishment have long been recognized (Mirenowicz and
Schultz 1996), they only recently gained more attention
(Matsumoto and Hikosaka 2009; Brischoux et al. 2009;
Lammel et al. 2011, 2012). The inter-relationship between
reward and punishment avoidance has been accounted for
by observations in animals that some of the avoidance
reactions in anticipation of punishment are similar to the
approach responses in anticipation of reward (Ikemoto and
Panksepp 1999) and by two-factor theories of avoidance
behavior (Mowrer 1947; Maia 2010) suggesting that the
transition from an unsafe to a safe state is coded similarly
to a reward.
In humans, psychopharmacological research generally sup-
ports a causal role of dopamine in promoting reward-seeking
behavior. Administration of L-DOPA (the biochemical pre-
cursor of dopamine), augments a signal in the dopami-
nergically innervated reward system during reward prediction
(Pessiglione et al. 2006) and increases the likelihood of choos-
ing stimuli associated with greater reward (Bodi et al. 2009).
Furthermore, a recent study showed that the administration of
L-DOPA enhances the reported anticipated pleasure of posi-
tive future life events (Sharot et al. 2009). Thus, although the
role of dopamine in guiding human social interaction remains
elusive, these results suggest that the dopaminergic system
might bias social behavior towards increasing personal mon-
etary rewards at the cost of those of other people. For punish-
ment avoidance, the evidence for an effect of dopaminergic
pharmacology is less clear. Neuroimaging studies showed that
increasing dopamine levels did not influence reward system
activity for actions leading to the avoidance of punishment
(Guitart-Masip et al. 2012) and did not influence the likeli-
hood that an individual chooses stimuli associated with a
smaller likelihood of punishment (Pessiglione et al. 2006).
However, on a behavioral level, lowering dopamine levels
using a dietary manipulation decreased the probability of a
subject choosing a symbol that yielded an unexpected mone-
tary loss (Robinson et al. 2010), which might be taken as
evidence for a dopaminergic involvement in punishment
avoidance.
Together, this may be taken as evidence that the dopami-
nergic system influences the extent to which an individual
seeks rewards and avoids punishments. However, no study
has addressed so far whether such influence also applies to
social behavior. We thus investigated the influence of a single
dose of 300 mg of L-DOPA versus a placebo on social
interaction in an economic bargaining game with two condi-
tions, one with the presence and one with the absence of a
punishment threat.
All participants who received L-DOPA or placebo were
assigned the role of a proposer who has the opportunity to
transfer part of an initial endowment to a recipient. Partici-
pants did this in two randomly presented conditions. In the
“punishment condition”, they were informed that the recipient
could punish unfair transfers. Although the “punishment con-
dition” has similarities with the ultimatum game (Güth et al.
1982), punishment in this condition is not dichotomous as in
the ultimatum game but rather continuous. Thus, in this con-
dition, the proposers face a trade-off between maximizing
monetary profit and the increasing likelihood of punishment
and monetary loss. Therefore, decisions are largely guided by
punishment avoidance. In the other condition, the “reward
condition”, the recipient cannot punish unfair transfers. Here,
there is a temptation to violate the fairness norm, and transfers
are mostly influenced by the proposers' reward seeking. To
exclude learning effects, we did not provide feedback about
the recipients' punishment to the proposers until the end of the
experiment. Thus, if L-DOPA administration mainly influ-
ences reward seeking during social interaction, corresponding
decisions in the social interaction paradigm would be to make
lower transfers in the “reward condition”, compared to place-
bo administration. If L-DOPA increases punishment avoid-




Two-hundred one healthy young male participants with a
mean (±SD) age of 21.9±2.3 years took part in a double-
blind, placebo-controlled parallel session experiment which
was approved by the local ethics committee. All participants
provided written informed consent before participating. Four
participants reported nausea, and their data were discarded,
leaving a sample of 197 participants.
Experimental procedure
A total of 18 experimental sessions were conducted with an
average number of 11.2 participants per session. Participants
were randomly assigned to either receive a single dose of
300 mg Madopar (consisting of 300 mg L-DOPA and 75 mg
benserazide, a peripheral L-dihydroxyphenylalanine-decar-
boxylase inhibitor) (n=101) or a placebo (n=96).
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Upon arrival at 8:30 am, participants received a standard-
ized meal and one serving of water and were required to ingest
10 mg of domperidone as they indicated to have done so 12 h
before L-DOPA administration (i.e., on the evening before the
behavioral experiment). This was done to diminish possible
peripheral dopaminergic side effects such as nausea and or-
thostatic hypotension. Immediately after, participants were
asked to rate their subjective feelings on visual analogue
scales (VAS, described below). After participants had read
the instructions for the task, they had to answer control ques-
tions to ensure comprehension of the rules of the paradigm.
Sixty minutes after L-DOPA intake, when the plasma level of
L-DOPA reached its peak (Eisenegger et al. 2010), VAS were
assessed again, and participants started the behavioral task
(described below), which was implemented in z-Tree software
and presented on computer screens (Fischbacher 2007).
Participants received a flat fee of 80 Swiss francs (1.00
CHF ≈ $1.00) for participation in the experiment. In addition,
they received a variable payoff for the bargaining game, in
which 10 points were worth 0.19 CHF. Each participant
received payment in private at the end of the experiment based
on the points earned in the task.
Social decision-making task
Participants played four trials of two conditions of a
bargaining game (Spitzer et al. 2007), where they could split
an initial endowment of 100 monetary units (MUs) (equiva-
lent to 1.90 CHF) between themselves (player A) and a
recipient (player B). The conditions were presented in random
order. Participants, always playing the role of A, faced new
and randomly assigned Bs in each trial.
In one condition, which we will refer to as the “punishment
condition”, participants were required to distribute 100 MUs
between themselves and the recipient B. They were informed
that the recipient could either accept or punish unfair offers.
Each player received an additional endowment of 25 MUs. B
could spend all or part of the 25 MUs to reduce A's earnings.
Every MU B invested into punishment led to a reduction of
A's earnings by 5 MUs. For example, if A decided to keep all
100 MUs for himself and B punished maximally, then A's
earnings (100MUs initial endowment plus 25MUs additional
endowment) were reduced by 125 MUs.
In contrast to the “punishment condition,” in the second
condition, B was a passive recipient of A's monetary transfers.
Thus, this condition lacks a punishment threat to A and
therefore is similar to a dictator game. Hence, transfers are
mostly influenced by the proposers' motivation to acquire
monetary rewards and are only counteracted by potential
fairness considerations towards the recipient. We will refer
to this condition as the “reward condition.”
To generate a credible punishment threat in the “punish-
ment condition,” the number of MUs that could be spent on
punishment were calibrated in a previous behavioral pilot
study (n=23). At the end of this pilot study, the partici-
pants in the role of player B agreed that their decisions
could be reused in other sessions of the experiment. In the
subsequent study, each player A faced the decisions of
those in the role of player B and hence faced decisions of
real human opponents. Both players A and B were paid
real money. However, player B earned money twice, once
in the pilot experiment and once in the main experiment
in which he was endorsed with the average transfers of all
player As.
After the bargaining game, we further elicited individuals'
perception/attitudes of fairness by confronting them with a
hypothetical scenario; participants were asked to indicate how
many MUs they would spend to punish a proposer if he
transfers 10, 20, or 50 MUs. Finally, participants filled out
questionnaires, including the behavioral inhibition and behav-
ioral activation scale (BIS/BAS) (Carver andWhite 1994).We
assessed the BAS reward responsiveness subscale and the BIS
anxiety subscale (Heym et al. 2008) to explore putative pre-
existing trait differences in reward and punishment sensitivity
in the two treatment groups.
Measures of possible drug-related side effects
Visual analogue scales were recorded before substance admin-
istration and before the decision-making task was performed.
Items in the scale were alert/drowsy, calm/excited, strong/feeble,
muzzy/clear-headed, well-coordinated/clumsy, lethargic/energe-
tic, contented/discontented, troubled/tranquil, mentally slow/
quick-witted, tense/relaxed, attentive/dreamy, incompetent/ pro-
ficient, happy/sad, antagonistic/amicable, interested/ bored, and
withdrawn/gregarious. These dimensions were presented as 10-
cm lines on a computer screen, and participants marked their
current states on each line with a mouse click. In line with
previous studies (Chamberlain et al. 2006; Norris 1971), the
factors alertness, contentedness, and calmness were calculated
from these items.
Data analysis
The applicability of parametric or non-parametric statistical
tests was assessed using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, testing
for differences of normally distributed data, if not otherwise
indicated. According corrections of the degrees of freedoms
for violations of homogeneous/equal variances (tested with
Bartlett's test and Levene's test) were applied in all parametric
tests. To test transfer differences across conditions, we used a
Wilcoxon signed rank-test, accounting for non-normally dis-
tributed and repeated data. To analyze drug effects on propos-
er transfers we applied Mann–Whitney U tests. The influence
of drug treatment on participants' attitudes towards fairness was
tested using a repeated measures ANOVA with hypothetical
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proposer's offers (10, 30, 50 MUS) as within-subject factors
and drug treatment as between-subjects factors. This para-
metric test was used despite that we have non-normally
distributed data in order to retain the possibility to test
the interaction of drug treatment and hypothetical pro-
poser's offers. To control for baseline measures such as drug-
related side effects and personality trait differences in BIS/
BAS, the transfers in the “reward condition” with a skewed
distribution with frequent omission were transformed to fre-
quency data (by counting the frequency of transfers greater
than zero). This allowed the responses to be analyzed with
generalized linear models (negative binominal distribu-
tion with a logarithmic link function), with drug treat-
ment as a between-factor and trait measures as well as
measures of drug-related side effects as covariates. Significant
differences were set at p<0.05.
Results
We found that the punishment threat increased the proposers'
transfers in the “punishment condition,” compared to pro-
posers' transfers in the “reward condition” (Wilcoxon signed
rank test, Z=11.77, p<0.001, Fig. 1a). This shows that pro-
posers largely disregard fairness norms in the “reward condi-
tion”, but behave more norm-compliant in the “punishment
condition,” indicating the effectiveness of the punishment
threat.
We then looked at how dopaminergic drug challenge
influenced transfers in the two conditions and found that in
the “reward condition,” proposers who were given a placebo
transferred an average of 5.00 MUs (±11.57 SD) to the recip-
ient. Under the influence of L-DOPA, proposers transferred
only an average of 2.52 MUs (±7.69 SD) to the recipient
(Mann–Whitney U test, Z=2.06, p<0.039). In contrast to the
“reward condition,” there was no significant effect of L-
DOPA on proposers' transfers in the “punishment condition”
(Mann–Whitney U test, Z=0.021, p<0.983). Also, after con-
trolling for transfers in the “reward condition,” L-DOPA did
not significantly alter the transfer differences between the
“reward condition” and “punishment condition” (Mann–
Whitney U test, Z=1.245, p<0.213). This additional analysis
ruled out that the observed effects of L-DOPA on reward
seeking (i.e., lower transfers in the “reward condition”) might
have counteracted the hypothesized effect of L-DOPA on
punishment avoidance in the “punishment condition.”
Given that distributions of transfers in the “punishment
condition” and the transfers in the “reward condition” (skewed
to zero transfers) were fundamentally different, it was not
applicable to calculate an interaction between game condition
and drug treatment, which would provide a statistical proof for
the specificity of the drug-treatment effect. To furnish alterna-
tive support for the specificity of the drug treatment on be-
havior in the “reward condition” but not in the “punishment
condition,” we calculated the Bayes factor of the null hypoth-
esis (that is, L-DOPA on proposers' transfers in the “punish-
ment condition” has no effect) against the alternative hypoth-
esis of drug effect, using a two-tailed Bayesian t test (Rouder
et al. 2009). This revealed that the data is 8.7 times more likely
under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothe-
sis, indicating strong evidence (Raftery 1995) for the absence
of an effect of L-DOPA on transfers in the “punishment
condition.”
The observed dopaminergic effect was not attributable to
the side effects of drug administration. There were no signif-




























































Fig. 1 Proposers' average transfers. a Proposers' average transfers to the
recipient over four trials for the punishment and reward conditions. The
proposers' transfer is closer to the fairness norm of equal splitting in the
punishment condition, indicating the effectiveness of the punishment
threat. b Proposers of the L-DOPA group made significantly smaller
transfers in the reward condition compared to proposers of the placebo
group. In the punishment condition, proposers' transfers did not differ
significantly between the L-DOPA and placebo group, suggesting that
increased availability of dopamine may enhance selfish behavior if it
cannot be punished. Vertical lines indicate ±1 standard error of the mean
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side effects (alertness, contentedness, and calmness) between
measurements at baseline and just before the behavioral task
was performed (all ts (195)<1.19, all ps>0.232). In addition,
after controlling for side effects just before the experimental
task, the main effect of drug administration on transfers in the
“reward condition” remained significant (generalized linear
model, χ2=6.61, p<0.010).
Based on previous evidence suggesting that trait reward
sensitivity is linked to decisions in similar contexts (Scheres
and Sanfey 2006), we found that participants in the placebo
group with high behavioral activation scale reward-
responsiveness measures (BAS RR) made fewer transfers in
the “reward condition” (generalized linear model, χ2=4.895,
p<0.026). Furthermore, BAS RR and the behavioral inhibi-
tion scale measure (BIS) did not correlate with offers in the
“punishment condition”, in neither experimental group (non-
parametric Spearman correlations, all ρs<0.148, p>0.150).
We also tested whether the observed dopaminergic drug
effect on proposer transfers could be related to pre-existing
trait differences of participants in the L-DOPA and the placebo
group. However, proposers in the L-DOPA group did not
differ from those in the placebo group in BAS RR (t
(195)=1.532, p>0.127), and BIS (t (195)=1.382, p>0.168).
Importantly, after controlling for trait-level BAS RR and BIS
in the main analysis, the effect of drug treatment on transfers
in the “reward condition” remained significant (χ2=4.693,
p<0.030).
Finally, we tested whether an effect of L-DOPA on selfish
behavior may stem from an effect on the attitude towards
fairness rather than on reward seeking. Participants were
asked to indicate how many MUs they would spend to punish
a proposer if he transfers 10, 20, or 50 MUs. These
questions were hypothetical and did not have monetary
consequences. Thus, by removing monetary incentives, we
remove the role of rewards during social interaction and
test whether L-DOPA changed participants' attitude towards
fairness. First, our results indicate that proposers were
sensitive to fairness norms (repeated measures ANOVA,
main effect of hypothetical offers, Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected for non-sphericity, F (1.551, 302.5)=271,684,
p>0.001). The amount of MUs spent to punish an unfair
proposer transfer of 10 MUs was 13.0 MUs, which was
significantly higher than 8.6 MUs spent to punish a pro-
poser who transfers 30 MUs (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
Z=8.661, p<0.001), which was in turn significantly higher
than 1.7 MUs spent to punish fair transfers of 50 MUs
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=10.389, p<0.001). Further-
more, the average amount of MUs spent to punish proposer
transfers in the L-DOPA group did not differ from the
placebo group (repeated measures ANOVA, hypothetical
offers × drug treatment, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected
for non-sphericity, F (1.551, 302.5)=0.373, p>0.635).
This suggests that the decrease in offers after L-DOPA
administration in the “reward condition” is not due to induced
distortions of the attitude towards fairness.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the admin-
istration of a dopaminergic drug influences human social
interaction in the presence and absence of a threat of punish-
ment for defying the fairness norm. Given how rewards and
punishments influence normative social behavior and the
involvement of dopamine in reward and punishment process-
ing, we hypothesized that dopaminergic drug challenge would
modulate social behavior in the context of rewards and
punishments.
We found that a single dose of L-DOPA decreases the
amount of money a proposer is willing to transfer to a recip-
ient if he is not facing the threat of being punished for
selfishness. Because the proposer can fully indulge in his
self-interest to maximize monetary reward in this situation,
our results support a role for the dopaminergic system in
reward seeking during social interaction. Furthermore, our
results suggest that the main neurochemical system involved
in reward processing might facilitate selfish behavior in the
absence of punishment threats.
In line with a previous study (Scheres and Sanfey 2006),
the positive association of self-reported reward sensitivity
with proposer transfers in the “reward condition” suggests
that transfers in this condition are generally driven by the
extent to which an individual seeks rewards. In keeping with
our main hypothesis, we observed lower transfers following
L-DOPA administration suggesting that increasing global do-
pamine levels which have been shown to increase reward
seeking (Pessiglione et al. 2006), facilitates selfish behavior
in a social context. Finally, the fact that we found no effect of
L-DOPA on the answers to the hypothetical scenarios, let us
rule out an alternative explanation saying that L-DOPA
changed the proposers' attitude towards fairness per se.
Our data lent no support for the hypothesis that L-DOPA
might increase punishment avoidance, as no significant effect
on transfers in the “punishment condition” was observed.
Furthermore, as we did not find a significant effect of L-
DOPA on the differences between transfers in the “punish-
ment condition” and transfers in the “reward condition,” we
could rule out that the observed effect of L-DOPA on reward
seeking (i.e., lower transfers in the “reward condition”) might
have obscured a putative effect of L-DOPA on punishment
avoidance. By subtracting the transfers in the “reward condi-
tion” (reflecting mainly fairness considerations) from the
transfers in the “punishment condition,” potential fairness
considerations are controlled for in the punishment condition.
Thus, these differences between transfers can be interpreted as
being purely driven by the proposers' attempt to maximize the
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monetary reward. This is important, as behavior which is
driven by the maximization of monetary reward in the “pun-
ishment condition” should not be affected by alterations in
reward seeking; on the one hand, a proposer with higher
reward seeking has a higher expected utility of making a small
offer because he can keep more money to himself. On the
other hand, this is balanced out by a second mechanism,
which is the associated loss of expected utility in case of
punishment (due to the resulting reduction of monetary pay-
off). Thus, if reward seeking refers to the utility of the mon-
etary income (regardless of fairness consideration) resulting
from the decision about the transfer in the “punishment con-
dition,” then the extent of reward sensitivity does not affect
this decision. In contrast, any alteration of punishment avoid-
ance would affect transfers in a positive way. Hence, we
conclude that L-DOPA has no significant effect on punish-
ment avoidance during social interaction.
Our results further substantiate a role for dopamine in the
generation of appetitively motivated behaviors. A recent study
in a non-social context showed that L-DOPA selectively
boosted striatal activity associated with actions leading to
reward, but not with actions leading to the avoidance of
punishment (Guitart-Masip et al. 2012). This is interesting,
as it raises the question for future studies about how L-DOPA
affects decision-making behavior when response require-
ments differ, such as when reward is attainable solely by
inhibiting a response and punishment can only be avoided
by an active response.
Finally, the results of this study not only emphasize a role
for the dopaminergic system in human social interaction in
general, but might also be relevant from a clinical perspective.
For instance, Parkinson's disease patients receiving dopami-
nergic drugs on a regular basis might show more selfish
behavior (O'Sullivan and Lees 2011) in line with the idea that
(over)stimulation of reward circuits enhance the value of
rewards (Dagher and Robbins 2009; Leyton et al. 2002;
Rogers 2011). Furthermore, individuals with anti-social spec-
trum disorders show a pronounced disregard for social norms
(De Brita and Hodgins 2009) and these disorders usually have
a high comorbidity with drug addiction, which is in turn
linked to egocentric behavior according to clinical reports
(Rounsaville 2004). This further underlines a neurobiological
link between the dopaminergic system and norm compliance
(Buckholtz et al. 2010; Gunter et al. 2010). Interestingly,
individuals affected by one of the most extreme forms of
anti-social behaviors, psychopathy, seem to have elevated
levels of a metabolite of the neurotransmitter dopamine in
the cerebrospinal fluid (Soderstrom et al. 2001), and a recent
neurochemical imaging study demonstrated that the dopami-
nergic reward system is hyper-responsive to monetary and
drug rewards in psychopaths (Buckholtz et al. 2010). By
showing that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may
bring selfish behavior to the fore in a laboratory setting, we
shed new light on potential causal relationships between the
dopaminergic system and norm-abiding behaviors observed
in a subset of clinical populations.
In summary, we demonstrate that L-DOPA administration
decreases the amount a proposer transfers to a recipient in
situations during which selfishness cannot be punished, but
does not significantly affect transfers in situations with a
potential punishment for selfishness. Since there is evidence
from studies in a non-social context that the dopaminergic
system influences the extent to which an individual seeks
rewards we assume that our finding is not necessarily related
to social situations alone. While our results primarily demon-
strate a causal role for the dopaminergic system in reward
seeking during social interaction, they also suggest that dopa-
mine might play a relatively minor role in modulating social
behavior that is guided by the avoidance of punishments. This
might suggest, in turn, that punishment threats are particularly
relevant to enforce fairness in individuals who have a neuro-
biological predisposition for reward hypersensitivity.
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